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In this reply to the comment of McVay and Kane (2010), I consider their argument concerning how
Watkins’s (2008) elaborated control theory informs their perspective on the role of executive control in
mind wandering. I argue that although in a number of places the elaborated control theory is consistent
with the perspective of McVay and Kane that mind wandering represents a failure of executive control,
their account makes a number of claims that are not articulated in the elaborated control theory—most
notably, the hypothesis that level of construal moderates entry of thoughts into awareness. Moreover, the
relevant literature suggests that the relationship between level of construal and executive control may be
more complex, and may be determined by multiple factors beyond those proposed in this executive-
control failure account of mind wandering. Finally, the implications of this model of mind wandering for
understanding repetitive thought in general are considered, and it is proposed that examining level of
executive control as a further moderating variable within elaborated control theory may be of value.
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In contrasting the evidence consistent and inconsistent with the
account that mind wandering recruits executive processes (Small-
wood & Schooler, 2006) and with the account that mind wandering
represents a failure of executive control, McVay and Kane (2010)
have provided a valuable integration of the extant literature. More-
over, they made a plausible argument that mind wandering is best
accounted for by the combination of failures in executive control
coupled with thoughts generated automatically in response to
environmental and mental cues. This proposed “executive-control
failure” explanation of mind wandering builds considerably and
extends on the elaborated control theory of repetitive thought
(Watkins, 2008). Therefore, this reply will focus on (a) the con-
sistency of these elaborations with the control theory account and
(b) the wider implications of this account of mind wandering for
repetitive thought (RT) in general.
It is important to note that the Watkins (2008) review of RT has
a rather different emphasis from the current comment. First, it is
focused on RT in general rather than on mind wandering specifi-
cally. Although mind wandering will often be a form of RT, for
example, when off-task thoughts during a task or activity keep
returning to the same themes, mind wandering need not be repet-
itive: Off-task thoughts can be expansive, open, and divergent,
and, as such, would not be considered as RT. Thus, there is not
necessarily always a direct correspondence between the processes
underpinning RT and those underpinning mind wandering, al-
though there is clearly some overlap. Second, Watkins focused on
explaining the differential constructive versus unconstructive con-
sequences of RT, whereas McVay and Kane (2010) focused on
explaining the onset and frequency of mind wandering. The main
argument of Watkins is that RT that is characterized by (a) a focus
on negative content combined with (b) high-level, more abstract
construals will have the most unconstructive consequences. In
contrast, McVay and Kane proposed that level of construal plays
a direct role in the onset and frequency of mind wandering.
With this different emphasis, the McVay and Kane (2010)
executive-control failure account of mind wandering makes central
to its account a number of assumptions that were relatively minor,
implicit, or not present in Watkins’s (2008) review. It is therefore
useful to examine whether these extensions are consistent with
the original theory and can be justified within the current evidence
base. Such extrapolation from the original theory can also be
valuable by leading to further clarification of previous assumptions
that may not have been fully articulated.
The first key assumption relevant to elaborated control theory
made within this executive-control failure account (see McVay &
Kane, 2010) is that level of construal influences the onset and
frequency of RT (mind wandering), and, more specifically, the
entry of off-task thoughts into conscious awareness; for example,
“The entry of these thoughts into awareness is moderated by
control over the level of construal (i.e., control over whether
thoughts are about immediate task demands or about more ab-
stract, high-level goals)” (p. 190). It is important to recognize that
this view—that is, that level of construal influences what thoughts
enter awareness—is neither predicted nor articulated within the
elaborated control theory (Watkins, 2008). Rather, more precisely,
the elaborated control theory argues that RT will be triggered by a
discrepancy between a goal and the current situation, and will
continue either until the goal is met or until the individual disen-
gages from and abandons the goal (Carver & Scheier, 1990;
Klinger, 1975; Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). Moreover, within
control theory, it is hypothesized that goals and behaviors are
hierarchically organized and can be processed at different levels of
abstraction, with more abstract, superordinate goals and standards
guiding and informing more specific, subordinate goals and stan-
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goals occurs by specifying reference values at the next lower level
of abstraction, all the way down to the concrete representations
required to specify the actual behaviors needed to progress toward
the goal (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner,
1987). As such, the elaborated control theory argues that specify-
ing the reference values at more abstract levels (e.g., by adopting
a more abstract level of construal) can prolong RT, because (a)
superordinate abstract goals may be too vague to provide clear
guidance as to when it is met or how to meet it, and (b) more
abstract goals may make goal disengagement more difficult—that
is, the more abstract the representation of the goal, the more
important the goal becomes to the general sense of self and the
harder it becomes to disengage from the goal (Martin & Tesser,
1996; McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Millar, Tesser, & Millar, 1988).
Thus, this executive-control failure account of McVay and Kane
(2010) is consistent with elaborated control theory in hypothesiz-
ing that more abstract levels of construal will lead to more RT in
the form of more extensive and more frequent mind wandering
about current concerns, because such thoughts will be more per-
sistent. However, it diverges from the elaborated control theory in
proposing that more abstract construals will increase entry of
off-task thoughts into consciousness because the elaborated con-
trol theory does not explicitly consider the role of abstraction on
accessibility of thoughts. Elaborated control theory does not pre-
dict that more abstract thoughts will be more likely to enter into
awareness than concrete thoughts. This hypothesis is therefore a
novel extrapolation beyond the elaborated control theory account
of RT. It is certainly an interesting hypothesis, worth further
investigation, especially because it suggests that level of construal
influences both the conscious accessibility and persistence of
goal-related thoughts.
McVay and Kane (2010) suggested that one mechanism under-
pinning this hypothesis is that off-task thoughts are less likely to
enter consciousness when the level of construal is more concrete
because concrete construal will focus thoughts on immediate task
demands and, thus, reduce the likelihood of off-task thoughts.
Although this mechanism is plausible, it is important to recognize
that it is possible to also have concrete thoughts that are off task
such as being distracted by the immediate environment (e.g.,
looking out of the window when one is trying to write a paper).
The other suggested mechanism of McVay and Kane that “an
abstract level of construal allows for a large network of related
concepts to be activated, increasing the number of off-task
thoughts that are likely to be generated” (p. 190) is also plausible,
especially as it is consistent with suggestions in control theory that
processing at a higher level affords more alternative subgoals and
behaviors to resolve the goal discrepancy (Brunstein & Gollwitzer,
1996). Nonetheless, despite an extensive literature confirming that
unresolved and blocked goals increase the priming and accessibil-
ity of goal-relevant information and the perseverance of goal-
related thoughts (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Martin & Tesser,
1989), to my knowledge there is not any evidence that different
levels of abstraction of these goals influences the accessibility of
goal-relevant information (e.g., off-task thoughts). Thus, there is
an important untested assumption at the heart of this executive-
control failure account with respect to whether level of construal
influences the initial shift into consciousness of unresolved con-
cerns. A key next step would be to seek empirical evidence for this
hypothesis by examining the effect of manipulating level of con-
strual of goals during studies of priming and accessibility of
goal-relevant information.
The second key assumption relevant to elaborated control theory
within this account is that shifts in level of construal require
effortful executive control (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2010, focused
“specifically on Watkins’s perspective that executive control is
necessary to match the level of construal to the demands of the
situation” p. 190). Indeed, this hypothesis was explicitly articu-
lated within the elaborated control theory (Watkins, 2008), albeit
briefly:
Third, effective regulation of level of construal in response to situa-
tional demands is hypothesized to require good cognitive and central
executive control. Thus, individuals with deficits in executive/
inhibitory control, either because of greater cognitive load or reduced
cognitive resources, would be impaired at effectively regulating level
of construal in response to situational demands. (p. 194)
Importantly, the elaborated control theory account also noted that
level of construal was influenced by factors other than deliberate
executive control, including situational and motivational factors,
such as beliefs about the need to understand why things happen. As
well as evidence that people shift to more concrete construals
when faced with difficult or novel situations (e.g., Vallacher,
Wegner, & Frederick, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber,
Wood, & Arps, 1984), there is evidence that in neutral and happy
moods, people adopt a more global, abstract processing style but
shift into a more local, concrete processing style in response to a
sad mood (e.g., Beukeboom & Semin, 2005, 2006; Bless, Schwarz,
Clore, Golisano, & Rabe, 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002). In addi-
tion, psychological distance has been found to also influence level
of construal, such that greater temporal distance, spatial distance,
social distance, and reduced probability (increased hypotheticality)
for an event or behavior all produce more abstract construals of
that event or behavior (see Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007, for
review). Thus, it appears that environmental and situational factors
other than executive control can influence level of construal,
suggesting that the view that executive control solely determines
level of construal is an oversimplification.
Furthermore, it is as yet unresolved how much the shift in level
of construal in response to situational demands (such as psycho-
logical distance, mood, or difficulty) is an automatic learned
process or whether it requires deliberate, effortful control. This is
an important point for future theoretical and empirical clarifica-
tion. Construal theory (Trope et al., 2007) proposes that the rela-
tionship between psychological distance and level of construal is a
learned bidirectional association. When objects are at a greater
physical distance, individuals cannot see specific details of the
object but only more abstract properties (e.g., at a great distance,
individuals could recognize an object as a person but are unable to
differentiate those specific features that would identify him or her
as a particular individual). Construal theory hypothesizes that this
relationship between distance and abstraction becomes over-
learned and generalized to other situations. The logic of this
analysis is that the shift in level of construal produced by changes
in psychological distance should be relatively automatic and not
require executive control. Consistent with this proposition, the
construal theory literature has reliably demonstrated that the way
information is framed and the way language is used can manipu-
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argument could be made for the effects of mood or familiarity/
difficulty on level of construal, particularly when there is potential
positive reinforcement for this shift in level of construal if it helps
to adaptively respond to circumstances. In contrast, the executive-
control failure account (McVay & Kane, 2010) hypothesizes that
shift in level of construal is predominantly determined by effortful
control.
Perhaps the most conservative assumption at this point is that
like many cognitive operations, level of construal can be influ-
enced both by effortful control and automatic association-based
processing. To further refine both the elaborated control theory of
RT and McVay and Kane’s (2010) executive-control failure theory
of mind wandering, future research will need to further disentangle
the relative strength of these different mechanisms and determine
how conflict between them is resolved.
Finally, it is important to note that evidence for an association
between level of construal and executive control is limited and
mainly indirect. There is evidence that the use of concrete con-
struals frees up cognitive resources and improves task perfor-
mance, especially when the task is considered difficult or occurs
under conditions of high cognitive load (e.g., Brandsta ¨tter, Leng-
felder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999; Vallacher, Wegner,
& Somoza, 1989). Nonetheless, the relationship between level of
construal and executive control has not been empirically unpacked,
suggesting this as a valuable line of research. In particular, testing
whether shifts in level of construal in response to situational
demands is an automatic response or an effortful one—perhaps by
examining whether the shift is impaired by provision of a cognitive
load, fatigue, or alcohol—would be an important line of inquiry.
The ideas of McVay and Kane (2010) can also be extended back
into the consideration of RT more generally, with implications for
researchers’ theoretical models of RT. First, I note that McVay and
Kane drew upon a literature indicating that task-unrelated thoughts
increase with fatigue and with alcohol consumption, and decrease
with higher working memory capacity, as further evidence that
mind wandering results from control-system failures. The logical
corollary of this reasoning, which was not discussed in Watkins’s
(2008) review, is that other forms of RT, such as depressive
rumination, should also be influenced by these other factors that
influence executive control (e.g., fatigue, alcohol, or individual
differences in working memory capacity). This hypothesis has
obvious clinical implications. For example, fatigue is a common
symptom of depression, which may make individuals with depres-
sion more prone to rumination. Moreover, it would predict that
periods of sleeplessness (e.g., waking in the middle of the night) or
of alcohol consumption would be periods during which individuals
would be particularly prone to RT.
Second, a major contribution of McVay and Kane (2010) is the
articulation of the Control Failure  Concerns view that empha-
sizes the interaction of executive-control ability, presence of cur-
rent concerns (in control theory terms, unresolved goals), and the
relevance of the context for activating these concerns, linked to the
onset of mind wandering. This hypothesis accounts for the effects
of elevating personal concerns on subsequent off-task thought
frequency, and for the reduction in task-unrelated thoughts in older
adults in experimental studies. Moreover, there may be value in
extending this hypothesis to other forms of RT. For example, the
onset of depressive rumination can be understood in terms of the
reduced executive control found in depression (e.g., Hertel, 1997;
Joormann, 2006), coupled with ongoing personal concerns related
to loss and unresolved important goals that would be primed by
current circumstances. The relevance of this approach to other
forms of RT is still an empirical question, but there is some
evidence consistent with this view. Kashdan and Roberts (2007)
found that for individuals with higher levels of social anxiety, but
not for individuals with low levels of social anxiety, postevent
rumination was associated with increases in negative affect fol-
lowing personal disclosure but was associated with decreases in
negative affect following small talk. Thus, there was an interactive
effect of personal concerns and context on RT. What remains to be
examined is the moderating role of executive-control capabilities.
In sum, McVay and Kane (2010) have highlighted that adding
level of executive control as a moderating variable would be a
useful further extension of Watkins’s (2008) elaborated control
theory with respect to explaining the onset and persistence of RT.
Moreover, they proposed a direct relationship between level of
construal and executive control. This is an idea with considerable
potential implications for the elaborated control theory of RT that
requires further empirical testing.
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